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Abstract. We consider the facility location problem in two dimensions.
In particular, we consider a setting where agents have Euclidean pref-
erences, defined by their ideal points, for a facility to be located in R2.
For the utilitarian objective and an odd number of agents, we show that
the coordinate-wise median mechanism (CM) has a worst-case approx-
imation ratio (WAR) of
√
2
√
n2+1
n+1
. Further, we show that CM has the
lowest WAR for this objective in the class of strategyproof, anonymous,
continuous mechanism . For the p − norm social welfare objective, we
find that the WAR for CM is bounded above by 2
3
2
−
2
p for p ≥ 2. Since
it follows from previous results in one-dimension that any determinis-
tic strategyproof mechanism must have WAR at least 21−
1
p , our upper
bound guarantees that the CM mechanism is very close to being the best
deterministic strategyproof mechanism for p ≥ 2.
1 Introduction
We consider the problem of locating a single facility in R2, given a finite set of
agents who have Euclidean costs defined by their private ideal locations. A cen-
tral authority wishes to choose a facility location that optimizes some measure
of social welfare. Since the ideal points are private information, the mechanism
choosing the facility location based on reported ideal points must be strate-
gyproof. Hence, the problem is to check if the mechanism choosing a socially
optimal location is strategyproof, and if not, to find a strategyproof mechanism
that best approximates the optimal social cost.
This problem has been extensively studied in the literature known as Approx-
imate Mechanism Design without money. It was first introduced by Procaccia
and Tennenholtz [26] who studied the setting of locating a single facility on a
⋆ We are grateful for the feedback provided by seminar audiences at the Caltech Theory
Lunch, SISL seminar, ISI Delhi, summer school of Econometric society at DSE.
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real line under the utilitarian (sum of individual costs) and egalitarian (maxi-
mum of individual costs) objectives. Since then, the problem has received much
attention, with extensions to alternative objective functions ([11], [12],[14], [6]),
multiple facilities ([19], [10],[27]), obnoxious facilities [7], different networks ([1],
[9], [21]), and other variations. In the class of deterministic strategyproof mecha-
nisms for locating a facility, the median mechanism has been shown to be optimal
under various objectives and domains. [20] provides a good survey of results on
approximation ratios achieved in several of these settings.
There is also a large literature in social choice theory on characterising the
set of strategyproof mechanisms under different assumptions on preference do-
mains ([23], [28]). In multiple dimensions, the characterizations typically include
or are completely described by the coordinate-wise median mechanism ([17],
[5], [24], [3]). The strong axiomatic foundations of the coordinate-wise median
mechanism, together with the nice properties of the median in one dimension,
motivate our study of the coordinate-wise median mechanism against the opti-
mal mechanism in two dimensions under a variety of social cost functions.
There has been some recent work in extending the facility location problem
to multiple dimensions. [18] characterises regions in the Euclidean plane that
would lead to the optimal facility location being strategyproof when agents may
want the facility to be close or far from their location on a real segment. [31] and
[30] show that the generalized median mechanisms are not group-strategyproof
in Euclidean space and the incentive of group misreport is unbounded. The most
closely related work is Meir ([22]), who uses techniques different from ours to
find the approximation ratio for the coordinate-wise median mechanism for the
case of three agents.
1.1 Our contribution
Our main contribution is to show that for n odd, the coordinate-wise median
mechanism has a worst-case approximation ratio of
√
2
√
n2+1
n+1 under the min-
isum objective. Using the worst-case profile and the characterisation from [17],
we establish that there is no deterministic, strategyproof, anonymous and contin-
uous mechanism that does better. Using the one-dimensional analysis of [11], we
show that for the p−norm objective, the worst-case approximation ratio for the
coordinate-wise median mechanism is bounded above by 2
3
2
− 2
p for p ≥ 2. Since
it follows from [11] that any deterministic strategyproof mechanism must have
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approximation ratio at least 21−
1
p , our bounds suggest that the coordinate-wise
median mechanism is (at worst) very nearly optimal.
2 Preliminaries
We study the problem in which a facility is to be located in R2. Let N =
{1, 2, . . . , n} be the set of agents. Each agent i has a Euclidean cost ; that is,
there is a point xi = (ai, bi), called agent i’s ideal point, such that her cost for
locating the facility at y is C(y, xi) = d(y, xi). We denote by x the profile of
ideal points: x = (x1, . . . , xn).
We assume there is a welfare objective summarized by a social cost function
sc, in the sense that locating the facility at y is (weakly) better than locating
the facility at z if and only if sc(y,x) ≤ sc(z,x).
2.1 Mechanisms
A mechanism is a function f : (R2)n → R2. A mechanism is said to be strate-
gyproof if no agent can benefit by misreporting her ideal point, regardless of the
reports of the other agents. Formally:
Definition 1. A mechanism f is strategyproof if for all i ∈ N , xi, x′i ∈ R2,
x−i ∈ (R2)n−1,
C(f(xi, x−i), xi) ≤ C(f(x′i, x−i), xi).
Definition 2. A mechanism f is anonymous if for any permutation pi : [n] →
[n],
f(x1, . . . , xn) = f(xpi(1), . . . , xpi(n))
A mechanism f is continuous if it is a continuous function. A social cost
function is a function sc : R2× (R2)n → R. We denote by OPT (sc,x) the set of
minimizers for sc given x:
OPT (sc,x) = argminysc(y,x).
When OPT (sc, ·) is singleton-valued, we will abuse notation and use OPT (sc,x)
to refer to the unique element contained therein. When sc is clear from context,
we will suppress the first argument and write OPT (sc,x) simply as OPT (x).
To measure how closely a strategyproof mechanism approximates the optimal
social cost for a given preference profile, we use the notion of approximation ratio.
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Definition 3. The approximation ratio of a mechanism f at a profile x ∈ (R2)n
is
AR(f,x) =
sc(f(x),x)
sc(OPT (x),x)
·
To measure how closely a strategyproof mechanism approximates the optimal
social cost in the worst case, we use the worst-case approximation ratio.
Definition 4. The worst case approximation ratio of a mechanism f is
WAR(f) = sup
x∈(R2)n
AR(f,x).
The coordinate-wise median mechanism
Definition 5. The coordinate-wise median mechanism is given by:1
c(x) = (median(a1, a2, . . . , an),median(b1, b2, . . . , bn)).
The coordinate-wise median has strong axiomatic foundations in the litera-
ture (see, e.g., [5], [24], [17]). In particular, the strategyproofness of CM follows
from the following result of [17]:
Lemma 1 (Kim and Roush, 1984). A mechanism f is strategyproof, anony-
mous and continuous if and only if there exist points p1, p2, . . . , pn+1 ∈ ({−∞,∞}∪
R)2 such that f(x) = c(x1, . . . , xn, p1, . . . , pn+1).
Note that for n odd, the coordinate-wise median mechanism is obtained by
taking, e.g., p1 = · · · = pn+1
2
= (−∞,−∞) and pn+1
2
+1 = · · · = pn+1 = (∞,∞).
Geometric median A point minimizing the sum of distances from a finite set
of points in a Euclidean space is known as a geometric median for that set of
points. The geometric median is characterised by the following result:2
Lemma 2. Let X be a Euclidean space. Given x ∈ Xn, a point y ∈ X is a
geometric median for x if and only if there are vectors u1, . . . , un such that
n∑
i=1
ui = 0
1 Note that this is only well-defined in the case that n is odd. We will also discuss
mechanisms which are adaptations of the coordinate-wise median mechanism to even
n.
2 See, e.g., [33]
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where for xi 6= y, ui = xi−y|xi−y| and for xi = y, |ui| ≤ 1.
This characterisation yields conditions under which changing a profile of
points does not change the geometric median, as summarized in the following
corollary:
Corollary 1. Let x ∈ Xn, and denote by y the geometric median of x. For any
i, if xi 6= y and if x′i ∈ {y + t(xi − y) | t ∈ R≥0}, then the geometric median for
the profile (x′i, x−i) is also y.
Informally, moving a point directly away from or directly towards (but not past)
the geometric median leaves the geometric median unchanged. We will use this
observation repeatedly in the sequel and note here that in fact it will be the only
characteristic of the geometric median that we use for much of the paper.
For the special case of n = 3, a more explicit characterisation is easily ob-
tained from Lemma 2:3 if any angle of the triangle formed by the three points
is at least 120o, g(x) lies on the vertex of that angle; otherwise, it is the unique
point inside the triangle that subtends an angle of 120o to all three pairs of
vertices.
2.2 Notation
We refer to the coordinates of points in R2 by a and b. We refer to the sets
R × {0} and {0} × R as the a-axis and the b-axis, respectively. We refer to the
sets ±R≥0 × {0} and {0}×±R≥0 as the ±a-axes and ±b-axes, respectively. We
refer to the geometric median by g(x)4. We use the notation ag(x) and bg(x)
to denote the first and second coordinates of g(x), respectively. Similarly, we
denote by c(x) the coordinate-wise median of x. We denote by ac(·) and bc(·)
the coordinates of c(·), so that c(x) = (ac(x), bc(x)).
We use the notation [yz] to denote the line segment joining y and z: {ty +
(1− t)z : t ∈ [0, 1]}. Similarly, we denote by (y, z) the set [yz] \ {y, z}.
3 Coordinate-wise Median mechanism’s WAR for the
minisum objective is not bad
In this section, we consider the objective sc(y,x) = (
∑n
i=1 |y − xi|). Assume that
n is odd and so the geometric median is unique. Consider the geometric median
3 This characterisation was obtained by Torricelli (1646) and is referred to as the
Torricelli point.
4 The geometric median is unique whenever n is odd or points are not collinear.
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mechanism, which chooses the geometric median g(x) at any profile x. Since this
mechanism is anonymous, continuous, and not a (generalized) coordinate-wise
median mechanism, it follows from Lemma 1 that it is not strategyproof.
Note that by definition, the geometric median mechanism has constant (and
hence worst-case) approximation ratio of 1. However, the question remains what
the best possible strategyproof approximation to the geometric median mecha-
nism is, in the sense of having the minimum possible WAR. Due to its strong
axiomatic foundations ([24], [17], [5], [25], [29] etc.), we consider the coordinate-
wise median mechanism as a candidate and investigate the problem of finding
its WAR.
We begin by stating our results. We then provide a full proof for the case
that n = 3, as we find the approach taken in its proof to be simple enough to
be digestible yet sufficiently similar to the more nuanced approach required for
arbitrary odd n as to be illuminating. We then provide a sketch of the proof for
all odd n, relegating the formal proof for this case to the appendix.
3.1 Results
Theorem 1. For n odd, the worst-case approximation ratio for the coordinate-
wise median mechanism is given by:
WAR(CM) =
√
2
√
n2 + 1
n+ 1
.
The argument for obtaining the exact value ofWAR(CM) is rather involved.
Interestingly, establishing an (asymptotically tight5) upper bound of
√
2 for any
odd n is fairly straightforward:
Lemma 3. For any profile x ∈ (R2)n,
sc(c(x),x) ≤
√
2 · sc(OPT (x),x).
The proof follows from observing that the median is optimal in one dimension
and that for any right triangle, the sum of the lengths of the legs is at most
√
2
times the length of the hypotenuse.
Remark 1. When n = 2m is even, the version of the coordinate-wise median
mechanism given by c(x) = (median(−∞,a),median(−∞, b)) has worst-case
5 Note that the WAR is monotonically increasing and converges to
√
2 as n→∞.
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approximation ratio equal to
√
2. This follows from the bound in the previous
lemma and the worst-case profile x where x1 = x2 . . . xm = (1, 0) and xm+1 =
xm+2 . . . x2m = (0, 1).
In both the n = 3 case and the general case, the key to the proof is to reduce
the search space for the worst-case profile from (R2)n to a much smaller space
of profiles that have a simple structure. In many cases, this involves “transform-
ing” one profile into another profile that has a higher approximation ratio and a
simpler structure. One important transformation that helps in significantly re-
ducing the search space involves moving a point xi directly towards g(x), getting
as close as possible to g(x) without changing c(x). Because this transformation
will be used repeatedly throughout this section, we provide here a proof that this
transformation leads to a profile (x′i, x−i) with a weakly higher approximation
ratio.
Lemma 4 (Towards geometric median). Let x be a profile and i ∈ N , and
let x′ be any profile such that
1. x′i ∈ [xi, g(x)],
2. for all j 6= i, x′j = xj , and
3. c(x′) = c(x).
Then AR(x′) ≥ AR(x).
Proof. By definition, g(x′) = g(x) and c(x′) = c(x). The change in optimal
social cost is given by |xi − x′i| while the change in social cost with respect
to coordinate-wise median is |c(x)− x′i| − |c(x)− xi|. By triangle inequality,
|xi − x′i| ≥ |c(x)− x′i|−|c(x)− xi|. Thus, the sc(OPT (·), ·) reduces by a greater
amount than sc(CM(·), ·) as we move xi to x′i. Since the ratio is always at least
1, it follows that AR(x′) ≥ AR(x). ⊓⊔
3.2 Proof for n=3
Define the set of Centered perpendicular (CP) profiles as follows:
CP = {x ∈ (R2)3 : c(x) = (0, 0) and ∀i, either ai = 0 or bi = 0}.
In words, a profile is in CP if the coordinate-wise median is at the origin and
all points in x are on the axes.
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Define the set of Isosceles-centered perpendicular (I-CP) profiles as follows:
I − CP = {x ∈ CP : ∃t such that x = ((t, 0), (−t, 0), (0, 1)) and g(x) = (0, 1)}
In words, a profile is in I −CP if there are two points on the a-axis equidistant
from the origin and the third point is at (0, 1), which is also the geometric
median.
We first show that we can reduce the search space for the worst-case profile
from (R2)3 to CP .
Lemma 5. For any profile x ∈ (R2)3, there is a profile χ ∈ CP such that
AR(χ) ≥ AR(x).
Proof. Let x ∈ (R2)3 be a profile. Let x′ be the profile where x′i = xi − c(x).
Then x′ has the same approximation ratio as x and c(x′) = (0, 0). Denote
A = {i : ai = 0} and B = {i : bi = 0}. Note that since c(x′) = (0, 0), it
follows from the definition of c(x′) that A 6= ∅ and B 6= ∅. For each i, define x′′i
as follows. Let Γ = {(a, b) ∈ R2 : a = 0 or b = 0}. If i ∈ A ∪ B, let x′′i = x′i;
otherwise, let x′′i be the point in [x
′
i, g(x
′)]∩Γ 6 that is closest to x′i. Then x′′i ∈ Γ
for all i and c(x′′) = (0, 0), so x′′ ∈ CP . Further, it follows from Lemma 4 that
AR(x′′) ≥ AR(x′) = AR(x); hence, taking χ = x′′ completes the proof.
⊓⊔
x2
x1
x3
c(x)
g(x)
x′3
Figure 3.2: Towards geometric median
Now we show that we can further reduce the search space from CP to I−CP .
6 The set [x′i, g(x
′)] ∩ Γ is non-empty because g(x′) cannot be in the same quadrant
as x′i. Any point in the same quadrant as x
′
i subtends an angle of less than 90
o with
the other two points and hence it cannot be the Torricelli point.
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Lemma 6. For any profile x ∈ CP , there exists a profile χ ∈ I −CP such that
AR(χ) ≥ AR(x).
Proof. Let x be a profile in CP .
Without loss of generality, we may assume that all xi are weakly above the
a-axis and there are at least two xi on the a-axis, since reflecting a profile in
CP across the a-axis, the b-axis, or the line a = b gives a profile in CP with the
same approximation ratio. Hence, we can label the points such that x1 = (−a, 0),
x2 = (b, 0), and x3 = (0, c), for some a, b, c ≥ 0.
If c = 0, then AR(x) = 1, and so every profile has approximation ratio
weakly greater than x. Hence, we may further assume that c > 0.
Since x1 and x2 are on the a-axis, it follows from the characterization of the
geometric median for three points given in Section 2.1 that −a ≤ ag(x) ≤ b
and 0 < bg(x) ≤ c. Hence, moving x3 to g(x) then (if necessary) translating all
points by the same vector so that the coordinate-wise median is at the origin
yields a profile in CP which has higher approximation ratio. Hence, we may
further assume that g(x) = x3.
Let x′ be the profile where x′1 = (−(a + b)/2, 0), x′2 = ((a + b)/2, 0), and
x′3 = (0, c). By definition, sc(g(x
′),x′) ≤ sc(g(x),x′) and by an argument that
exploits the convexity of the distance function, sc(g(x),x′) ≤ sc(g(x),x). Com-
bining these inequalities gives sc(g(x′),x′) ≤ sc(g(x),x), and a simple calcula-
tion shows that sc(c(x′),x′) = sc(c(x),x). Thus, AR(x′) ≥ AR(x).
Note that under x′, g(x′) = (0, k) for some k ≤ c. Define x′′ to be the profile
with x′′1 = x
′
1, x
′′
2 = x
′
2, and x
′′
3 = g(x
′). Then, by Lemma 4, AR(x′′) ≥ AR(x′).
Finally, define x′′′ such that x′′′i =
1
c
x′′i for each i. Then since AR(·) is ho-
mogeneous of degree 0, AR(x′′′) = AR(x′′), and so AR(x′′′) ≥ AR(x). Further,
c(x′′′) = (0, 0), x′′′1 = (−t, 0), x′′′2 = (t, 0), and x′′′3 = (0, 1) for some t ≥ 0; in
fact, it follows from the characterisation of the geometric median that t ≥ √3.
Hence, x′′′ ∈ I − CP , and so taking χ = x′′′ completes the proof.
⊓⊔
Denote by ηt = ((t, 0), (−t, 0), (0, 1)). It follows from the arguments in the
proof of Lemma 6 that I − CP = {ηt : t ≥
√
3}. Let α(t) = 2t+1
2
√
t2+1
. A simple
calculation shows that for t ≥ √3, AR(ηt) = α(t). In particular, it follows that
WAR(CM) is equal to by supt≥√3 α(t). Since α(t) achieves its global maximum
at t∗ = 2 >
√
3, WAR(CM) = AR(η2) = α(2). Since α(2) =
√
2
√
32 + 1
3 + 1
, the
result follows.
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3.3 Outline for general (odd) n
We now consider the case of n = 2m+ 1 agents. We begin by defining classes of
profiles analogous to those used in the proof for n = 3.
We define the class of Centered Perpendicular (CP) profiles as all profiles
x ∈ (R2)n such that
– c(x) = (0, 0)
– for all i, either ai = 0 or bi = 0 or xi = g(x)
– if x′i ∈ (xi, g(x)), then c(x′i, x−i) 6= (0, 0)
Since the last condition is slightly more subtle than the others and will be
important in the sequel, we describe it now in words. This condition says that
any (nonzero) movement of any xi towards the geometric median would result
in a change in the coordinate-wise median.
We define the class of Isosceles-Centered Perpendicular (I-CP) profiles as all
x ∈ CP for which there exists t ≥ 0 such that
– x1 = · · · = xm = (t, 0)
– xm+1 = (−t, 0)
– xm+2 = · · · = x2m+1 = (0, 1)
– g(x) = (0, 1).
The proof proceeds much as in the proof for n = 3. We first show that for
every profile, there is some profile in CP with weakly higher approximation ratio.
The approach used in the n = 3 case extends naturally here: first, translate the
profile x ∈ (R2)n so that coordinate-wise median moves to the origin; then,
starting from i = 1 and going to i = n, move xi directly towards the geometric
median until either it reaches the geometric median or moving it further would
move the coordinate-wise median. The resulting profile is in CP and has an
approximation ratio that is weakly greater than x’s.
c(x)
g(x)
Figure 3.3: A CP profile
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Next, we show that for any profile in CP , there is some profile in I−CP with
weakly higher approximation ratio. The approach used in the n = 3 case for this
step does not extend in a straightforward manner to the general case—the main
obstruction arises from the fact that for a profile x in CP , there may be i ∈ N
such that xi = g(x), which may not be on either axis. The next subsection is
devoted to giving an overview of the procedure used to transform a profile in
CP to one in I − CP with weakly higher approximation ratio.
Finally, the approach used to calculate the worst-case approximation ratio
for profiles in I − CP has much the same structure as in the n = 3 case. We
define ηt = (x
t
1, . . . , x
t
2m+1), where
xti =


(t, 0), i = 1, . . . ,m
(−t, 0), i = m+ 1
(0, 1), i = m+ 2, . . . , 2m+ 1
and we show that I−CP =
{
ηt : t ≥
√
2m+1
2m−1
}
. Defining α(t) = (m+1)t+m
(m+1)
√
t2+1
, we
show that for t ≥
√
2m+1
2m−1 , AR(ηt) = α(t), and that α(t) has a global maximum
at t∗ = m+1
m
>
√
2m+1
2m−1 , from which it follows that
WAR(CM) = α
(
m+ 1
m
)
=
√
2
√
(2m+ 1)2 + 1
(2m+ 1) + 1
=
√
2
√
n2 + 1
n+ 1
.
(−m+1
m
, 0) (m+1
m
, 0)
(0, 1)
m agents1 agent
m agents
c(x)
g(x)
Figure 3.3: Worst case profile
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3.4 Reduction from CP to I − CP
Next, we discuss informally some transformations that allow us to deal with
the profiles in CP . Without loss of generality (using reflections if necessary as
in the n = 3 case), we may restrict consideration to profiles x ∈ CP with
g(x) = (ag, bg) such that ag ≥ 0, bg ≥ 0, and bg ≥ ag.
1. Reducing axes: In this step, we move all points on −b-axis to −a-axis
while keeping them equidistant from c(x) = (0, 0). This works because the
sc(c(·), ·) remains the same while sc(g(·), ·) reduces, as the points move closer
to the old geometric median. Thus, we get a profile in which all points are
either on one of the +a-, +b-, or −a-axes or at g(x).
2. Convexity: Consider a profile obtained after applying step 1. Transform
the profile so that all points on the +a-, +b-, and −a-axes are at their
mean coordinates on the +a-, +b-, and−a-axes respectively. Again, sc(c(·), ·)
remains the same while sc(g(·), ·) falls because of convexity of the distance
function. Thus, we get a profile with weakly higher approximation ratio
which has k points at (−b, 0), m+1− k points at (0, c), m+1− k points at
(a, 0) and k− 1 points at g(x). Note that we are able to pin down the exact
cardinalities of these sets because of the third condition in the definition of
CP , which requires that if any of the points were to move towards g(x),
then c(x) would change.
3. Double Rotation: Consider a profile obtained after applying step 2. Trans-
form the profile by moving the k − 1 points at g(x) to (0, α), where α =
d(c(x), g(x)), and moving k − 1 of the k points at (−b, 0) to (β, 0), where β
is the unique positive number such that d(g(x), (β, 0)) = d(g(x), (−b, 0)). In
this case, one can show that the increase in sc(c(·), ·) is at least √2 times the
increase in sc(g(·), ·) and therefore, by Lemma 3, it follows that the approx-
imation ratio weakly increases. Applying convexity again, we get a profile
such that there is one point at (−b, 0), m points at (0, c) and m points at
(a, 0). Note that g(x) may still not be on the axes.
4. Geometric to axis: Consider a profile obtained after applying step 3. Trans-
form the profile so that the m points at (0, c) are at g(x), then translate all
points by the same amount so that the coordinate-wise median is back to
the origin. Doing so weakly increases the approximation ratio and yields a
profile where one point is at (−b, 0), m points are at (0, c), m points are at
(a, 0) and g(x) = (0, c).
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From here, we apply a transformation similar to step 2 to get a profile in
I − CP . Note that we have suppressed some details (especially when the same
transformation must be used repeatedly) in order to make the exposition as clear
as possible—see the appendix for a rigorous proof.
4 Coordinate-wise Median mechanism’s WAR for the
p-norm objective is not bad
In this section, we consider the objective sc(y,x) = (
∑n
i=1 |y − xi|p)
1
p for p ≥ 2.
We refer to this objective as the p-norm objective. Feigenbaum et al. [11] consider
this objective for the one-dimensional problem and obtain the following result:
Lemma 7 (Feigenbaum et al, 2017). Suppose there are n agents with ideal
points a = (a1, a2, . . . , an) ∈ Rn. Then the social cost incurred by the median
mechanism under the p-norm is at most 21−
1
p times the optimal social cost.
Further, there are no deterministic strategyproof mechanisms with a lower worst-
case approximation ratio.
In particular, if ac is the median of (a1, a2, . . . , an) and OPT (a) is the optimal
location, then
∑n
i=1 |ac − ai|p ≤ 2p−1
∑n
i=1 |OPT (a)− ai|p
We consider the problem of quantifying the WAR for the coordinate-wise
median mechanism under the p-norm objective when agents have ideal points in
R
2.
Theorem 2. For the p-norm objective with p ≥ 2, 21− 1p ≤WAR(CM) ≤ 2 32− 2p
The lower bound follows directly from Lemma 7. The upper bounds are
obtained by using the following inequalities, together with Lemma 7:
(α2 + β2)
p
2 ≥ (αp + βp) αp + βp ≥ 21− p2 (α2 + β2) p2 .
5 Coordinate-wise Median mechanism’s WAR is pretty
good
In this section, we aim to compare the performance of the coordinate-wise median
mechanism against other strategyproof mechanisms. We begin by stating the
conjecture that motivates this work on the coordinate-wise median:
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Conjecture 1. For n odd and p ≥ 1, CM has the lowest WAR for the p-norm
among all deterministic strategyproof mechanisms.
For the case p = 1, which corresponds to the minisum objective, we have the
following result, which we view as progress towards the conjecture.
Theorem 3. For n odd and the minisum objective, CM has the lowest WAR
among all deterministic, strategyproof, anonymous, and continuous mechanisms.
Remark 2. We note that our proof of Theorem 3 makes heavy use of the worst
case profile w derived in Theorem 1. Specifically, the proof uses the character-
isation of Lemma 1 and shows that for any generalized median mechanism f ,
we can find a profile w′, where w′i = wi + θ for some fixed θ ∈ R2, such that
f(w′) ∈ P + θ, where P = {−(m+1)
m
, 0, −(m+1)
m
}× {0, 1}. Then, we show that for
any of these six locations, we can find a profile which is the same as w up to
translation and reflection, and whose AR for the mechanism under consideration
is at least as high as WAR(CM). The formal proof is in appendix.
For general p, we are able to show quantitatively that CM can not be much
worse than the optimal deterministic strategyproof mechanism. As we show in
Theorem 2, WAR(CM) for the p-norm is bounded above by 2
3
2
− 2
p for p ≥
2. In addition, Lemma 7 gives a lower bound on WAR for any deterministic
strategyproof mechanism, as summarized in the following corollary:
Corollary 2. Any deterministic strategyproof mechanism for facility location in
R
2 has WAR at least 21−
1
p for the p-norm objective.
Since the ratio ofWAR(CM) and this lower bound is at most
√
2 for p ≥ 2, it
follows that for such p no deterministic strategyproof mechanism has a worst-case
approximation ratio that is better than CM by more than a factor of
√
2. This
implies that the coordinate-wise median mechanism is already very close to being
optimal. While Theorem 2 gives bounds on WAR(CM) for arbitrary p, more
precise results follow directly for p = 2 and p = ∞ from previous work in the
one-dimensional setting. Even though these results extend in a straightforward
way, we are not aware of anyone stating them explicitly, and so we mention
them here for completeness. For p = 2 (also referred to in the literature as the
miniSOS objective), both the bounds in Theorem 2 are equal to
√
2 and thus
WAR(CM) =
√
2. Thus, it follows from the second part of Lemma 7 that there
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is no deterministic strategyproof mechanism with a better WAR for p = 2.
For p = ∞ (also referred to in the literature as the minimax objective), any
deterministic strategyproof mechanism has WAR ≥ 2 [26]. Also, any pareto
optimal mechanism has WAR ≤ 2. Together, we get that WAR(CM) = 2 for
the minimax objective, and hence again there is no deterministric strategyproof
mechanism that does better.
6 Conclusion
We show that the social cost of the coordinate-wise median is always within
√
2
√
n2 + 1
n+ 1
of the social cost obtained under the optimal mechanism. Using the
worst case profile, we further show that there is no deterministic, strategyproof,
anonymous, and continuous mechanism that does better. For the p-norm objec-
tives, we find that the worst-case approximation ratio for the coordinate-wise
median mechanism is bounded above by 2
1
2
− 1
p · 21− 1p for p ≥ 2, and we observe
that, by [11], the worst-case approximation ratio for any deterministic strate-
gyproof mechanism is bounded below by 21−
1
p . Thus, our bounds show that in
these cases, at worst the coordinate-wise median mechanism is within a factor
of
√
2 of being optimal.
Work on higher-dimensional facility location problems remains hitherto rel-
atively limited, but we are optimistic that the results and methods used in this
paper will encourage further research in this fundamental domain. We wish to
stress, in particular, that the simple structure of the worst-case profile can pro-
vide a ready tool for researchers looking to advance progress on the conjectural
optimality of the coordinate-wise median mechanism. We also hope that the
techniques used in the proof of Theorem 1 can be adapted to the problem for
other p-norms or more general families of social welfare objectives.
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7 Appendix
Proof (Lemma 3). Let xi = (ai, bi), c(x) = (ac(x), bc(x)) and g(x) = (ag(x), bg(x)).
For any right triangle, the sum of the lengths of the legs is at most
√
2 times
the length of the hypotenuse. Thus, together with the optimality of the median
mechanism in one dimension we get
√
2
n∑
i=1
|xi − g(x)| ≥
n∑
i=1
|ai − ag|+
n∑
i=1
|bi − bg|
≥
n∑
i=1
|ai − ac|+
n∑
i=1
|bi − bc|
≥
n∑
i=1
|xi − c(x)|
Hence, the worst-case approximation ratio for the coordinate-wise median
mechanism is at most
√
2. ⊓⊔
Proof (Theorem 1).
Define Centered Perpendicular (CP) profiles as all profiles x ∈ (R2)n such
that
– c(x) = (0, 0)
– for all i, either ai = 0 or bi = 0 or xi = g(x)
– if x′i ∈ (xi, g(x)), then c(x′i, x−i) 6= (0, 0)
Lemma 8 (CP). For any profile x ∈ (R2)n, there exists a profile χ ∈ CP such
that AR(χ) ≥ AR(x).
Proof. Let x ∈ (R2)n be a profile. Let x′ be the profile where x′i = xi−c(x). Then
x′ has the same approximation ratio and c(x′) = (0, 0). Denote A = {i : ai = 0}
and B = {i : bi = 0}. Note that since c(x′) = (0, 0), it follows from the definition
of c(x′) that A 6= ∅ and B 6= ∅. Let Γ = {(a, b) : a = 0 or b = 0}∪g(x′). Starting
from i = 1 and going till n, define x′′i to be the point in [x
′
i, g(x
′)] ∩ Γ that is
closest to g(x′) under the constraint that c(x′′1 , x
′′
2 , . . . , x
′′
i , xi+1, xn) = (0, 0).
Then x′′ ∈ CP . Further, by lemma 4 AR(x′′) ≥ AR(x′) = AR(x); hence,
taking χ = x′′ completes the proof. ⊓⊔
Define Isosceles-Centered Perpendicular (I-CP) profiles as all x ∈ CP for
which there exists t ≥ 0 such that
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– x1 = · · · = xm = (t, 0)
– xm+1 = (−t, 0)
– xm+2 = · · · = x2m+1 = (0, 1)
– g(x) = (0, 1).
Next, we prove some lemmas that will be useful in reducing the search space
for the worst-case profile from CP to I − CP .
First, we show that we can reduce the number of half-axes that the points
lie on from (at most) four to (at most) three.
Lemma 9 (Reduce axes). Suppose x and x′ are profiles which differ only
at i where for some a > 0, xi = (0,−a) and x′i = (−a, 0), and for which
c(x) = c(x′) = (0, 0) and bg(x) ≥ ag(x) ≥ 0. Then AR(x′) ≥ AR(x).
Proof. Again c(x′) = c(x) and sc(c(x′),x′) = sc(c(x),x). Thus, it is sufficient
to show that sc(g(x′),x′) ≤ sc(g(x),x). For this, we just need to show that
d(x′i, g(x)) ≤ d(xi, g(x)). This follows from the following simple calculation:
d(x′i, g(x))
2 = (ag(x) + a)
2 + bg(x)
2
= ag(x)
2 + 2ag(x)a+ a
2 + bg(x)
2
≤ ag(x)2 + bg(x)2 + 2abg(x) + a2
= ag(x)
2 + (bg(x) + a)
2
= d(xi, g(x))
2.
⊓⊔
Next, we show that we can combine points on each of the three half-axes
while weakly increasing the approximation ratio.
Lemma 10 (Convexity). Let x ∈ CP and let S ⊆ N be such that for all
i ∈ S, ai > 0 and bi = 0. Let xS be the mean of the xi across i ∈ S. Let x′ be
the profile where
1. x′j = xj for j /∈ S and
2. x′j = xS for j ∈ S.
Then AR(x′) ≥ AR(x).
Proof. It is immediate that c(x′) = c(x). Hence, it will be sufficient to show
that AR for x′ with c(x) and g(x) instead of c(x′) and g(x′) is at least as big
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as AR(x). Indeed, sc(c(x),x′) = sc(c(x),x)) and sc(g(x′),x′) < sc(g(x),x′) <
sc(g(x),x) where the last inequality follows from convexity of the distance func-
tion. ⊓⊔
The same argument applies for any of the other strict half axes.
Next, we show that we can move all the points that are on the geometric
median to the axis in a way that weakly increases the approximation ratio.
Lemma 11 (Double Rotation). Let x and x′ be profiles that differ only at
i1 and i2, such that for some a ≥ 0
– c(x) = (0, 0),
– bg(x) ≥ ag(x) > 0,
– xi1 = (−a, 0),
– x′i1 = (a+ 2ag(x), 0),
– xi2 = g(x), and
– x′i2 = (0, d(g(x), (0, 0))).
Then c(x′) = (0, 0) and AR(x′) ≥ AR(x).
Proof. The first claim is immediate.
For the second claim, let
A =
∑
i6=i1
d(xi, c(x))
B =
∑
i6=i2
d(xi, g(x)).
By a previous result,
A+ d(xi1 , c(x)) ≤
√
2B.
Hence, it follows that
[A+ d(xi1 , c(x))]d(x
′
i2
, g(x)) ≤
√
2Bd(x′i2 , g(x)).
But since bg(x) ≥ ag(x), it follows that d(x′i2 , g(x)) ≤
√
2ag(x). Hence,
[A+ d(xi1 , c(x))]d(x
′
i2
, g(x)) ≤ 2Bag(x)
= B(d(x′i1 , c(x))− d(x′i2 , c(x))).
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From this it follows that
(A+ d(xi1 , c(x)))(B + d(x
′
i2
, g(x))) = AB +Bd(xi1 , c(x)) + [A+ d(xi1 , c(x))]d(x
′
i2
, g(x))
≤ AB +Bd(x′i1 , c(x))
= (A+ d(x′i1 , c(x)))B
and hence
AR(x) =
A+ d(xi1 , c(x))
B
≤ A+ d(x
′
i1
, c(x))
B + d(x′i2 , g(x))
=
A+ d(x′i1 , c(x
′))
B + d(x′i2 , g(x))
≤ AR(x′).
⊓⊔
Once we have all the points on the three half-axes, we now show that we can
move the geometric median to the axis as well.
Lemma 12 (Geometric to axis). Suppose that x is a profile such that there
are a ≥ 0 and b, c > 0 and subsets L,R,U ⊆ N with L∩R = L∩U = R∩U = ∅,
L ∪R ∪ U = N , |L| = 1, |U | = |R| = m, and
– xi = (0,−a) for i ∈ L
– xi = (0, b) for i ∈ U
– xi = (c, 0) for i ∈ R
and so that bg(x) ≥ ag(x) > 0.
Let x′ be the profile which is the same as x for i /∈ U and which has x′i = g(x)
for i ∈ U . Then AR(x′) ≥ AR(x).
Proof. Define
h(t) =
(a+ (1− t)ag(x)) +m(c− (1− t)ag(x)) +mb
d((−a, 0), g(x)) +md((c, 0), g(x)) +mtd((0, b), g(x)) .
Then AR(x) = h(1) and AR(x′) = h(0). Hence, it will be sufficient to show that
h(1) ≤ h(0).
To see this, note that since the denominator of h(t) is strictly positive for
t ≥ 0 and since both the numerator and the denominator are linear in t, h(t) is
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monotonic on [0,∞). Now, note that since the approximation ratio is always at
least 1, h(0) = AR(x′) ≥ 1. Further,
lim
t→∞
h(t) =
(m− 1)ag(x)
md((0, b), g(x))
<
ag(x)
d((0, b), g(x))
< 1.
Hence, there is some t > 0 such that h(t) < 1 ≤ h(0), and so since h(t) is
monotonic on [0,∞), it follows that h(t) is decreasing on [0,∞). Thus, AR(x′) =
h(0) ≥ h(1) = AR(x). ⊓⊔
Finally, the following lemma shows that we can use convexity to make the
triangle formed by the three groups of points isosceles.
Lemma 13 (Isosceles). Let x be a profile such for which are m points at
(a, 0), 1 point at (−b, 0) and m points at (0, c), and for which g(x) = (0, c) and
c(x) = (0, 0). Let x′ be the profile where there are m points at
(
ma+ b
m+ 1
, 0
)
, 1
point at
(
−ma+ b
m+ 1
, 0
)
, and m points at (0, c). Then, AR(x′) ≥ AR(x).
Proof. Note that c(x) = c(x′) = (0, 0). Since m ∗ a+ b = m ∗ (ma+b)
m+1 +
ma+b
m+1 , we
get that the numerator in AR(x) and AR(x′) remains the same. Thus, we only
need to argue that the denominator goes down as we go from AR(x) to AR(x′).
Even though g(x′) may not be equal to g(x) we have that sc(g(x),x′) ≤
sc(g(x),x) by the convexity of the distance function which would imply sc(g(x′),x′) ≤
sc(g(x),x) by definition of g(x). Thus, we have that AR(x′) ≥ AR(x).
⊓⊔
Now, we use above lemmas to reduce the search space to I-CP.
Lemma 14 (ICP). For every x ∈ CP , there exists χ ∈ I − CP such that
AR(χ) ≥ AR(x).
Proof. Without loss of generality, consider any profile x ∈ CP such that bg(x) ≥
ag(x) ≥ 0. Applying Lemma 9 to all points on the negative b axis gives a
profile x′ with a weakly higher approximation ratio. In x′, we have all points
on positive a, negative a, positive b and the geometric median. Using lemma
10, we can combine the points on positive a, negative a, positive b to some
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(a, 0), (0, b), (−c, 0) while weakly increasing AR. Let this profile be x′′. Now, we
use lemma 11 to move points on the geometric median to +b-axis. Using 10
again, we get a profile x′′′ with m points on some (a, 0), 1 point on (−c, 0) and
m points on (0, b). Now we use lemma 12 to move the geometric median to the
axis. Then, we use lemma 13 which gives a profile x′′′ such that x′′′′ ∈ I − CP
and AR(x′′′′) ≥ AR(x). Setting χ = x′′′′ completes the proof.
⊓⊔
Using Lemma 14, we can now restrict attention to profiles in I −CP . Define
ηt = (x
t
1, . . . , x
t
2m+1),
where
xti =


(t, 0) i = 1, . . . ,m
(−t, 0) i = m+ 1
(0, 1) i = m+ 2, . . . , 2m+ 1
Then, I−CP =
{
ηt : t ≥
√
2m+1
2m−1
}
. Defining α(t) = (m+1)t+m
(m+1)
√
t2+1
, we get that for
t ≥
√
2m+1
2m−1 , AR(ηt) = α(t), and that α(t) is maximized at t
∗ = m+1
m
>
√
2m+1
2m−1 ,
from which it follows that
WAR(CM) = α
(
m+ 1
m
)
=
√
2
√
(2m+ 1)2 + 1
(2m+ 1) + 1
=
√
2
√
n2 + 1
n+ 1
.
Thus, we get that WAR(CM) =
√
2
√
n2 + 1
n+ 1
as required. ⊓⊔
Proof (Theorem 2).
The lower bound follows directly from lemma 7.
Consider any profile x = (ai, bi) ∈ (R2)n. Let g(x) = (ag(x), bg(x)) and
c(x) = (ac(x), bc(x)). Then, we have that
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sc(g(x),x)p =
n∑
i=1
|g(x)− xi|p
≥
(
n∑
i=1
|ag(x)− ai|p +
n∑
i=1
|bg(x)− bi|p
)
≥
(
n∑
i=1
|OPT (a)− ai|p +
n∑
i=1
|OPT (b)− bi|p
)
≥ 1
2p−1
(
n∑
i=1
|ca − ai|p +
n∑
i=1
|cb − bi|p
)
≥ 2
1− p
2
2p−1
n∑
i=1
|c(x)− xi|p
= 22−
3p
2 sc(c(x),x)p
Thus, we get WAR(CM) ≤ 2 32− 2p for p ≥ 2 as required.
⊓⊔
Proof. (Theorem 3) Using Lemma 1, we know that every deterministic, strate-
gyproof, anonymous, and continuous mechanism f is defined by points p1, p2, . . . , pn+1
such that f(x) = c(x, p). Consider any arbitrary such mechanism f . The worst
case profile w defines six important points which are P = {(a, b) ∈ R2 : a ∈
{−(m+1)
m
, 0, −(m+1)
m
}, b ∈ {0, 1}} as illustrated in figure 7.
Observe that if f(w) /∈ P , there exists some θ ∈ R2 such that f(w+θ) ∈ P+θ.
Thus, without loss of generality, we restrict attention to the case where f(w) ∈ P
and show that no matter which point f chooses under w in P , we can find a
profile x′ such that AR(f,x′) ≥WAR(CM) = AR(w).
If f(w) ∈ {(−(m+1)
m
, 0), (0, 0)}, then we set x′ = w and we are done. If
f(w) = (m+1
m
, 0), consider the w′ obtained by reflecting w around the b-axis. It
follows that f(w′) ∈ {( (m+1)
m
, 0), (0, 0)} where ( (m+1)
m
, 0) only has 1 agent on it
in w′. Thus, setting x′ = w′, we are done.
Now, if f(w) ∈ {(−(m+1)
m
, 1), (0, 1), ( (m+1)
m
, 1)}, consider the w′ obtained by
reflectingw around a-axis. It follows by definition of f that f(w′) ∈ {(−(m+1)
m
, 0), (0, 0), ( (m+1)
m
, 0)}.
This is same as the previous case and hence, we get that there is no determin-
istic, strategyproof, anonymous and continuous mechanism with a better WAR
than the coordinate-wise median mechanism.
⊓⊔
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(−m+1
m
, 0) (m+1
m
, 0)
(0, 1)
m agents1 agent
m agents
Figure 7: The six points
